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Abstract
Agricultural price distortion which is the discrepancy between world market price of
agricultural produce and price received by farmers as a result of market interventions
by governments, either through subsidies or taxes or even trade protection systems,
has received rare attention in the cocoa and coffee sub-sectors. This study examines
the contribution of mobile phone technology in reducing price distortions in cocoa
and coffee production. In addition, we tested stylized facts such as the development
paradox, resource abundance, and group-size effect in agricultural price distortions
literature. The findings suggest that access to mobile phones reduces the extent of price
distortions. The effect of mobile phone usage on the extent of price distortion, the
nominal rate
of assistance, and relative price margin is conditional on internet connectivity. Whereas
our results support the development paradox and group-size effect hypotheses, the
resource abundance hypothesis is not supported. Based on our results, policies that
seek to reduce the cost of telecommunication, increase competition in the
telecommunication industry, and increase economic growth would go a long way to
reduce price distortion in the cocoa and coffee industries.
Keywords: Price distortion, Nominal rate of assistance, Relative price margin, Mobile
phone, Cocoa, Coffee, JEL code, Q1, Q17, E64
Background
The aim of this study is to analyze the determinants of agricultural price distortions
with a particular focus on the role of mobile phone usage, using cocoa- and
coffee-producing countries as the case study. According to Anderson (2013), agricul-
tural price distortions are the discrepancies between world market prices of agricul-
tural produce and prices received by farmers as a result of market interventions by
governments, either through subsidies or taxes or even trade protection systems. Agri-
cultural revenue in developing and emerging countries has been severely distorted by
exogenous shocks, countries’ tax, and subsidy policies (Anderson 2013). Coupled with
these, the state of institutional quality in these countries, in addition to natural factors
such as climate change and vagaries of pests and diseases, can also constitute to price
distortion in the agricultural sector. For instance, the level of infrastructure deficits have
constrained the availability and access to productive inputs as well as the
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commercialization of agricultural production in Africa and this may create price distor-
tions as farmers become less efficient (Moyo et al. 2015). In addition, small farmers in
developing countries have little resilience to weather shocks making them vulnerable
(Niles and Salerno 2018).
Most farmers in developing and emerging countries depend on the proceeds from
their agricultural activities as the main source of livelihood, and such distortions in
prices create uncertainty for farmers. Although there have been significant progress to
reduce these distortions through improved infrastructure and favorable trade policies
which have resulted in a decrease in the wedge between farm gate prices and world
prices, many welfare and trade-reducing processes remain huge challenges in the
agricultural sector in developing countries (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008). Anderson
(2013) postulates that information communication technology (ICT) has the potential
of reducing agricultural price distortions. However, ICT penetration is low in develop-
ing countries1 compared to the developed world where almost everyone can easily
access and use ICT services, such as having access to farming and market price infor-
mation. Low or nonexistence of telecommunication services in rural areas in develop-
ing countries have exposed farmers to highly inefficient and information asymmetric
markets (Fafchamps and Minten 2012; Aker and Fafchamps 2014). This creates uncer-
tainty and also increases the risk of doing business (Abraham 2007).
In addition, farm households in developing countries face unstable and distorted mar-
ket prices due to poor access to information; this raises production cost and worsens
their welfare (Geertz 1978). Thus, farmers in developing economies are likely to face
price differentials due to inefficient and information asymmetric markets. Abraham
(2007) argues that the development of telecommunication services plays an important
role in reducing price differentials between markets of homogenous products. There-
fore, the use of instant telecommunication services would improve market information
access on prices, quantities, and potential market uncertainties of all kinds.
In spite of the enormous benefits from mobile phone technology, empirical studies
on the effects of mobile phone usage in reducing agricultural price distortions in the
area of cocoa and coffee sub-sector are rare. Existing studies have mainly focused on
the impact of mobile phone use on consumers’ welfare (Aker 2010; Overa 2006).
Further, Klonner and Nolen (2010) looked at the impact of mobile phone technology
on rural labor markets and they showed that employment increases substantially once
network coverage is introduced to an area. Likewise, Chowdhury (2006) showed that
having access to landline phones increases rural factor market participation by about
14% in Bangladesh. Labonne and Chase (2009) examined the effects of mobile phones
on per capita consumption of farm households in the Philippines and showed that
purchasing a mobile phone is associated with 11 to 17% increase in consumption.
Within the agricultural price context, Aker and Fafchamps (2014) explored the
relationship between mobile phones and price dispersion within millet, sorghum, and
cowpea markets in Niger. They established that mobile phone reduces price dispersion.
In order to fill the gap in the cocoa and coffee sub-sectors, the current study analyzes
the determinants of agricultural price distortions with a particular focus on the role of
mobile phone usage.
Most cocoa- and coffee-producing countries are from developing and emerging econ-
omies and these products are mostly the main foreign exchange earner for these
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countries. As a result, examining the determinants of price distortions in the cocoa and
coffee industries is important. The study uses the nominal rate of assistance and rela-
tive price margin as proxies for price distortions. Our analysis follows three different
steps. In the first step, we estimate the determinants of the extent of price distortion.
The extent of price distortion is measured by the absolute value of the nominal rate of
assistance. At this stage, we seek to examine whether or not mobile phone access re-
duces the magnitude of price distortion. We test the development paradox, resource
abundance, and group-size effect stylized facts as postulated by Masters and Garcia
(2009) at the second stage. Development paradox comes about when developing coun-
tries tax their agricultural produce which is the main foreign exchange earner, whereas
developed countries subsidize these produce (Bale and Lutz 1981; Masters and Garcia
2009). Resource abundance hypothesis stipulates that governments in land-abundant
countries tend to tax more or subsidize less their agricultural sector (Bale and Lutz
1981; Masters and Garcia 2009). According to Masters and Garcia (2009), the
group-size effect can affect outcomes through free-ridership in a case where individuals
in larger groups have more incentive to shirk on their responsibilities. In the last step,
we construct a relative price margin and analyze its determinants.
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, unlike Aker and
Fafchamps (2014) who focused on millet, sorghum, and cowpea markets in Niger, our
study considers the role of the mobile phone as a means of reducing agricultural price
distortions within the cocoa and coffee sub-sectors in developing and emerging econ-
omies. Second, whereas Lutz and Scandizzo (1980) and Anderson and Masters (2007)
considered an aggregated analysis of price distortions for all agricultural produce, we
restrict our analysis to explore the factors which influence tax imposition or subsidies
in cocoa- and coffee-exporting countries. Lastly, our construction of relative price mar-
gin as a proxy for price distortion is novel as no study has used such indicator before.
While the world price depends on the exogenous world economic reactions such as
global supply and demand and other macroeconomic factors, the farm-gate price, how-
ever, depends on each country’s trading policies and institutions (Fulginiti et al. 2004).
Therefore, the gap between domestic and world market prices can be used to reflect
the welfare trade effects through the so-called relative price margin, the difference
between world market price and farm-gate price.
Computing relative price margin index is very useful, as it represents the relative differ-
ences between world and farm-gate prices. While the values of nominal rate of assistance
account for other macroeconomic factors, the computation of relative price margin relies
only on observed nominal price values. Consequently, its values change differently from
one country to another based on how trade policies and institutions are structured for
specific governments. This implies that enhanced institutional quality (such as trust,
property right, rule of law, ease of information access, etc.) would reduce trade cost and
eventually reduce price distortions. In this study, we show that relative price margin is
positively related to nominal rate of assistance.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: “Development of agricultural
price distortions” section discusses the development of agricultural price distortions.
In “Literature review” section, we review relevant literature pertaining to the subject
matter. The conceptual framework, method, and estimation techniques are discussed
in “Methodology and estimation technique” section. Whereas, “Results and discussion”
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section presents and discusses the results, “Concluding remarks” section provides
concluding remarks and relevant policy implications of the findings from the study.
Development of Agricultural price distortions
Market intervention policies, by governments, have been influential in distorting agricul-
tural crop prices. In developing countries, usually, the governments levy taxes on farm
production while in developed nations, the governments usually subsidize it. This
tendency has been substantially documented, notably by Bale and Lutz (1981), Anderson
and Hayamis (1986), Krueger (1980), and Krueger et al. (1988) among others. In their
studies, the common argument is that most of the developing countries, especially in
Sub-Sahara Africa, levy taxes on the agricultural sector either directly or indirectly
through government policies thereby reducing the incentives to invest, hence a potential
decline in the growth of the sector (Magrinia et al, 2014; Akanegbu, 2015).
For instance, while more than 60% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s workforce still engaged in
agriculture sector and more than 80% of the region’s poor households depend mainly
on farming for their livelihoods, agricultural and trade policies remain key influences
on the pace and directions of change in Africa (World Bank 2007; Chen and Ravallion
2007). Concerning cocoa-producing countries, farm policies have changed frequently
over the years in different countries and the resulting distortions have heavily affected
small-holder farmers in cocoa production. The policy mix of direct and indirect taxes
through fiscal policy, marketing boards, trade barriers, foreign exchange restrictions,
and other development policies imposed a significant burden on farmers (Anderson
and Masters 2007). These policies surely are of great concerns, especially in developing
countries where a huge number of poor families depend mostly on agricultural
activities (Anderson 2010). Furthermore, price-depressing policies contribute to overall
global poverty and high inequalities (Anderson et al. 2010).
As far as coffee price distortion is concerned, the interventions of producing coun-
tries in domestic markets have been prevalent in many countries through parastatals
that controlled marketing and trade in the coffee industry. The coffee market may have
been subject to supply controls longer than any other important commodity. Domestic
policies in producing countries remain sensitive and hugely dependent to international
developments as well as to local pressures, and consequently, distortionary domestic
policies appear in many countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries
where coffee sector accounts for a big share of national gross domestic product (GDP)
(Baffes et al. 2005).
For instance in Sub-Saharan Africa, governments in countries like Côte d’Ivoire,
Cameroun, Nigeria, and Ghana consistently followed a set of policies aimed at encour-
aging the expansion of cocoa and coffee production, while at the same time taxing
small-holders heavily for capital accumulation and investment elsewhere in the econ-
omy (Anderson and Masters 2007). In addition, although the cocoa export volume
grew steadily since 1960, with a plateau from 1987 until 1994, and another plateau after
1999, throughout these periods there was never a sustained increase in farm-gate prices
(Maizels et al. 1997; Hecht 1983, p. 26). The countries’ agricultural policies to tax
cash-crop exports have been substantial, and from 1961 to 2004, the nominal rate of
assistance for cocoa and coffee showed an average effective taxation of 44 and 55%
respectively (Anderson and Masters 2007).
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Agricultural policies in Ghana have induced an important contribution to the general
setting of national economic policy, and shifts in sectoral policy have generally matched
reorientations in overall policy. In particular, policy toward the cocoa sector has gone
through dramatic changes, which have had a huge influence on the country’s collapse
and subsequent recovery of the economy. Specifically, Ghana’s cocoa policy, one of the
biggest export earners, has been a significant element of its overall economic policy
and has changed quite often along with the general orientation of economic policy over
time (Brooks et al. 2007).
It becomes clear that the government’s trade policies in Ghana have had an important
impact on the price incentives faced by the farmers. The cocoa sector was heavily mis-
managed, and only a minor share of the export price was returned to the producer. While
initially set up to protect farmers from price volatility, the monopolized marketing boards
like the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) and Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) gradually
turned into an instrument of public taxation. In this respect, the rents were always ex-
tracted by keeping producer prices well below the world price, and by using an
over-valued exchange rate to make payments to farmers (Brooks et al. 2007). These were
mainly caused by lack of efficiency, corrupted marketing monopolized boards, the increas-
ingly poor state of roads, and the shortage of spare parts. With the aim of generating
revenues, the government in Ghana has been creating cocoa price distortions due to the
wedge between the actual domestic prices and what those prices would be under free
market (Anderson et al., 2008).
Further, in East Africa, agricultural policies have also induced severe implications on
price distortions (an example is Uganda and Ethiopia). In addition to other policies, the
countries in East Africa have also used exchange rate margins between the official and
parallel market rates (in Uganda and Ethiopia), pan-territorial pricing, parastatal
system, and cooperative system (in Tanzania) as prevailing mechanisms to control
agricultural markets (Anderson and Masters 2007). Coffee is the main cash crop in all
these countries, and over a long time, the agricultural boards in these countries were
always responsible for marketing, processing, and exports. Owing to these monopolies,
coffee faced relatively high negative nominal rate of assistance, due to high taxes, and
during this period of high state control, producers received only 30% or less of the
reference price. For instance, in Ethiopia, the coffee taxation in the 1980s and 1990s
accounted for 11–27% of the farm gate prices. In addition, the government collected
progressive taxes based on the international price of coffee (Zewde 2002).
In southern America, specifically in Brazil, economic restructuring process in the
1990s has resulted in dramatic changes in economic policies including the agricultural
policy reforms. Countries started carrying out many agricultural policy transitions from
farm policies with substantial state interventions designed for a closed economy to a
new regime tailored to an open economy and a curtailed role of the state. In particular,
the coffee trade liberalization took place in the context of the economy-wide reforms of
the late 1980s and early 1990s. The sector benefited from a rapid fall in industrial
protection and from the elimination of taxes and quantitative restrictions on agricul-
tural exports. As a result, the coffee export tax which had been as high as 50% a decade
earlier was reduced to 37% in 1996 due to trade reforms by the government which saw
a removal of 13% value-added tax. This was in order to ease balance of payments
pressures without a devaluation.
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Unlike the unsuccessful agricultural policies in Sub-Saharan Africa, agricultural policy
reforms in Southern America, (e.g., Brazil in the 1990s) appear to have generally been
well integrated with international agricultural markets in the sense that the long run
trends in prices are broadly similar (Helfand 2003). Therefore, this can indicate that
since the dramatic agricultural trade reforms, the coffee prices have not been very
distorted in the country. This has positively resulted in drastic reduction of poverty in
Brazil as farmers started to gain from the trade reforms. The percentage of the rural
population in poverty and the total number of poor people in rural areas significantly
reduced since 1990s (Helfand 2003).
The agricultural trade policies in South-East of Asia, however, present different
features compared to the one in Southern America. For example, Indonesia, one of the
leading cocoa producers in the world, has opted to impose cocoa beans export tax with
the aim of supporting the downstream of cocoa processing industries (Permani 2013).
Although, the policy was established to promote investments in downstream
value-added activities in Indonesia, unfortunately, the cocoa export tax have caused
serious decline of cocoa production. For example, the export values of cocoa beans and
cocoa products from Indonesia to the world in 2009 reached US1,469,157,944
meanwhile in 2011 the number decreased to US 1,364,170,460 implying a decline of
7.15 percent over a two year period (Permani 2013; Rifin and Nauly 2013). It is
noteworthy to mention that the effects of these agricultural reforms hit the farmers
who only have limited alternatives to sell the cocoa beans.
Figures 1 and 2 depict the nominal rate of assistance for cocoa and coffee in selected
countries. Nominal rate of assistance (NRA) is defined as the rate at which governments
trade policies have directly raised or lowered farm gross income above or below what they
would be without government interventions (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008). Whereas
the positive value of the nominal rate of assistance signifies subsidy, negative values
denote taxes. Zero value of the nominal rate of assistance signifies no government
intervention, and the market price is synonymous to perfect competitive price.
Figures 1 and 2 show that over the period of 20 years, all cocoa- and coffee-trading
countries mostly impose tax on cocoa and coffee prices since the nominal rate of assist-
ance is mostly negative (with the exception of Brazil). However, the magnitude of the
tax differs across countries over time. The deviations in both figures are very uneven,
and do not follow any clear trend. This implies a high level of distortion in products
prices and farmers’ income have been unstable and unpredictable.
Literature review
Most of the economic policies in developing countries have modestly contributed to
agricultural growth and in some cases these depression policies hampered the efforts to
reduce poverty in rural areas. There are cases where sector-specific pricing and tax
policies have eventually resulted in substantial discriminations against agriculture (Gillis
et al. 1992; Anderson and Masters 2007). Further, there are instances where agricultural
policy interventions at all stages of production, markets, and consumption, with the
aim of improving market efficiency, have typically induced greater inefficiencies and
lower outputs and farm incomes (Bates 2014). As a result, farm incomes in many of
the developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, are stagnating and the
contribution made to overcome poverty is very unsatisfactory.
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A significant number of studies have empirically brought forward the effects of these
market price policies. Lutz and Scandizzo (1980) in their study on bias against agricul-
ture found that government interventions in agricultural commodity markets severely
distort market prices, farm incomes, and exchange rate as well. Different reasons have
been identified why governments in developing countries levy heavy taxes on agricul-
tural market commodities. One of such reasons is to raise revenue to finance govern-
ment expenditure. The second motive of agricultural market intervention in developing
Fig. 1 Graphical trend of NRA for cocoa-producing countries
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Fig. 2 Graphical trend of NRA for coffee-producing countries
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countries is to stabilize internal market prices. Thus, by achieving price stability via
intervention policies, government insulates local prices from unstable world market
prices. These policies, however, create distortions in the market.
Furthermore, Bale and Lutz (1981) observed that in developing countries, there are
welfare losses resulting from government intervention. The authors revealed that dis-
tortions from governments’ price policies affect both poor producers and consumers as
prevailing price deviates from the competitive market price. In another study, Isham et
al. (2005) found that countries with natural resource endowment are likely to secure
revenues from extraction and exploitations. Similarly, Masters and Garcia (2009)
showed that countries with abundant resource endowment tend to impose huge
agricultural taxes and with less subsidization policy option. Using land per capita to
analyze the effects of land resource endowment on market price distortions, they find
that government tend to tax landowners as land per capita increases.
Other studies have been looking at how much country’s institutional structure such
as social and economic institutions, infrastructural development, political and legal
frameworks determine the path of economic growth and development. However, it
becomes strenuous to identify which types of institutions matter and the extent of their
importance. According to Brunt (2007), any country is fully independent to define its
own institutions that can allow it to achieve the highest economic growth and
development. The development of economic infrastructures follows a rational,
well-coordinated, and harmonized system to ensure that farmers improve their produc-
tion (Perkins et al. 2005). Developing countries having poor economic infrastructures
and public utilities, especially in rural areas, make the cost of production high hence
making their produce less competitive (Aigbokan 1999).
The provision of social and economic infrastructure can expand cocoa and coffee
production. It is important to note that investment in physical infrastructure including
transport services, telecommunication, power, and irrigation can improve the product-
ivity of all inputs in the production process and allow market access facilitation that
would lead to economic development. Such investment strengthens long-run growth
performance by reducing farmers’ transaction costs (Jimenez 1995), hence increasing
the farm gate prices for the producers. In this respect, total factor productivity growth
is a function of infrastructure endowment under the assumption that where infrastruc-
ture facilities are developed farmers get easy transport hence reducing the price gap.
Therefore, expanding and upgrading the network of transportation, storage, and
distribution services, as well as developing telecommunication networks, including
mobile telephone usage, would be particularly useful in the agricultural sector to
stimulate the development of efficient and competitive markets (Demurger 2001),
which can be useful for farmers to resist price distortions.
However, the existing studies have yet to provide the potential nexus between ICT
use and agricultural price distortions. Specifically, this study examines the extent of
price distortions in coffee- and cocoa-producing countries and how the use of mobile
phone and internet coverages can affect distortions. To do so, we initially identify the
driving forces of coffee and cocoa price distortions in producing countries based on
price depression indices: nominal rate of assistance (NRA) and relative price margin
(RPM). Finally, this paper uses data from biggest cocoa- and coffee-producing countries
in three tropical regions, (SSA, Southeast Asia, and Southern America) to capture
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different agricultural policies across the regions. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first paper to investigate the effects of mobile phone use and internet on cocoa and
coffee price distortions.
Methods
Measuring agricultural price distortions
In this study, we measure agricultural price distortions using two instruments that are
framed by agricultural trade policies. These are the nominal rate of assistance (NRA)
and relative price margin (RPM) of coffee and cocoa products. The latter is viewed as
the proportion that explains the differences between world market and domestic farm
gate prices. Thus, it defines the wedge between farm gate and border prices. The
relationship between these two concepts (that is, NRA and RPM) is discussed as
follows. Recall that price distortions result primarily from market interventions by
governments, either through subsidies or taxes or even trade protection systems; this
generates discrepancies between two sets of prices. This discrepancy is defined as:
y1 ¼
Pw−Pwt
Pwt
ð1Þ
Where y1stands for nominal rate of assistance for cocoa and coffee prices for a given
trading country at given time, Pw and Pwt are the observed domestic distorted and un-
distorted crop prices respectively for cocoa and coffee products. This means that Pwt is
the estimated domestic coffee and cocoa prices that would prevail in the absence of
commodity market or exchange rates interventions. Therefore, the nominal rate of as-
sistance can be viewed as the rate at which farmers’ prices are distorted by exogenous
market interventions, specifically by the government trade policies. The value of NRA
is zero in the case of perfectly competitive market regime. It becomes positive in the
case where farmers are subsidized and negative if the government policy induces farm
taxes or market imperfection like weak institutions or poor communication of the
farmers (limited market awareness). Assuming perfect market, we can express undis-
torted domestic price in terms of distorted price as:
Pw ¼ Pwt þM ð2Þ
With Mbeing the interventions. Furthermore, in the case of competitive market, the
world price is related to distorted domestic price in the following way:
Pwt þM ¼ Wp−T ð3Þ
Where Wp and T are the world cocoa and coffee prices and transaction costs,
respectively. Therefore, we can define NRA taking into consideration world prices
as follows:
y1 ¼
Pw− Pw−Mð Þ
Pw−Mð Þ ¼
M
Wp−T−M
ð4Þ
From Eq. 4, the relationship between relative price margin and the nominal rate of
assistance can be derived. Given that, relative price margin is defined as follows:
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y2 ¼
Wp−Pwt
Pwt
ð5Þ
And provided that the domestic undistorted price is related to world price as
Pwt =Wp − T −M, then we can express the relative price margin in terms of world price
as shown in Eq. 6;
y2 ¼
Wp
Wp−M−Tð Þ−1 ð6Þ
Combining Eqs. (4) and (6), we can express relative price margin in terms of nominal
rate of assistance and world price as follow (see Appendix 1 for detailed derivations);
y2 ¼ y1ω−1 ð7Þ
Where ω is the boarder prices adjusted for transportation cost and agricultural trade
government interventions expressed as follows:
ω ¼ W
p
M
ð8Þ
From the expression in Eq. (7), there is a positive relationship between the nominal
rate of assistance and relative price margin. However, this relationship is not
one-to-one but adjusted by the world price and intervention ratio.
Conceptual and theoretical framework
The conceptual and theoretical frameworks for this study rest on perfect competition
assumption of perfect information and on stylized facts in agricultural policy that
relates policy choices to a commodity’s direction of trade, a country’s real income per
capita, and its endowment of farmland per capita (Masters and Garcia (2009)). Under
the perfect competitive assumption of perfect information, both buyers and sellers
should be well informed about the prevailing price of the commodity and any other
information about the location and quality of the product. Telecommunication in the
form of mobile phone technologies (that is, phone and internet) are the means by
which both buyers and sellers can have full information about the price and quality of
the product. As a result, price distortions in the agricultural sector would be reduced
given the information available to both buyers and sellers.
The stylized facts in agricultural policy that are of interest to this study are development
paradox, resource abundance, and group-size effect. The development paradox postulates
that developing countries tax their agricultural produces, whereas developed countries
subsidize (Bale and Lutz 1981; Masters and Garcia 2009). Given that farmers form the
majority and are mostly poor in developing countries, compared to their counterparts in
developed countries who are mostly wealthy, it is a paradox to tax farmers in developing
countries and subsidize those in developed countries. It also suggests that as real eco-
nomic growth increases, countries tend to provide subsidies to farmers. According to
Masters and Garcia (2009), the group-size effect can affect outcomes through
free-ridership in a case where individuals in larger groups have more incentive to shirk on
their responsibilities. However, opposite group-size effect arises when larger groups are
more influential since they can mobilize more votes in order to affect policies. Resource
abundance hypothesis stipulates that governments in land-abundant countries tend to tax
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more or subsidize less the agricultural sector (Bale and Lutz 1981; Masters and Garcia
2009). Given the fact that taxes and subsidies create distortion in price, the resource
abundance hypothesis is worth considering.
Empirical model specification
Our model assumes a static framework where the proxy for price distortion at a point
in time is explained by several factors. The empirical model estimates the determinants
of price distortion of cocoa and coffee products following the conceptual and theoret-
ical framework discussed earlier and the study by Masters and Garcia (2009). The
model is specified as follows:
Y i jt ¼ αþ β1GDPpercapit þ β2Ruralpopit þ β3Landpercap þ β4Telecomit
þ β5Continentþ λXit þ γ j þ ηi þ μt þ εi jt
for i ¼ 1;…N ; j ¼ cocoa and coffee; t ¼ 1;…T
ð9Þ
Where Yijt is the dependent variable of interest for country i and product j at time
period t. We consider three different forms of the dependent variableYijt. First, we focus
on the absolute value of the nominal rate of assistance to capture the extent of the
price distortions. In the second scenario, we considered both positive and negative
values of the nominal rate of assistance in order to examine the policy options of
government. Whereas the negative value of the nominal rate of assistance signifies
imposition of taxes, the positive value indicates subsidy. The rationale of this scenario
is to examine the factors which affect countries’ tax and subsidy policies in relation to
cocoa- and coffee-exporting countries. In the third scenario, we consider an alternative
measure of price distortion (that is, relative price margin).
The term GDPpercapit represents the natural log of GDP per capita for country i at
time period t. The inclusion of this term in our model is to test whether or not the devel-
opment paradox holds for cocoa and coffee products (Bale and Lutz 1981; Masters and
Garcia 2009; Magrini et al. 2014). This suggests that a positive relationship is expected
between the nominal rate of assistance and GDP per capita. Similarly, we included land
per capita (that is, Landpercap) in our model to test the resource abundance hypothesis
(Bale and Lutz 1981; Masters and Garcia 2009). Thus, we seek to find out whether
governments tend to tax more or subsidize less when there is more land per capita.
We further test the concept of group-size effect by including the proportion of the rural
population to the total population (Ruralpopit) in our model, as done by Bale and Lutz
(1981) and Masters and Garcia (2009). Our main variable of interest is the termTelecomit,
which captures telecommunication services. We expect a negative relationship between
price distortion and accessibility of telecommunication services since telecommunication
services make information easily accessible hence reducing transaction cost. In the
analysis, we consider both mobile phone usage and internet connectivity. The inclusion of
telecommunication services as a determinant of price distortion is motived by Aker and
Fafchamps (2014). We also include an interaction term between mobile phone usage and
internet connectivity. This is to capture the complementarity between mobile usage and
internet connectivity in affecting price distortion. Thus, the total effect of mobile usage on
price distortion is conditional on internet connectivity. This is expressed as follows:
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∂Y ijt
∂Mobilephoneit
¼ βT þ βTI Internetit ð10Þ
Where βT and βTI is the direct and indirect effect of mobile phone usage on price
distortion, respectively.
The term Xit in Eq. 9 represents a vector of control variables such as institutional
quality, inflation and public debt. With quality institutions in place, government pol-
icies have the potential of achieving its intended outcome. Given that some elements of
price distortion is due to government interventions in the form of taxes and subsidies,
we expect a mixed relationship between institutional quality and price distortion
(Anderson and Masters 2007). In our analysis, we use polity2 as an indicator of institu-
tional quality. According to Anderson and Masters (2007) and Masters and Garcia
(2009), government distortionary policies in the form of taxes and subsidies is
dependent on the state of the macro-economy. As such, we control for the level of
inflation and public debt in our empirical model. The inclusion of inflation in our
analysis is to examine whether or not domestic inflation has any effect on the nominal
rate of assistance and relative price margin. The level of public debt can influence the
extent to which government would want to impose a tax or provide a subsidy. As a
result, we seek to examine to what extent does public debt affect price distortions.
There is possible non-linearity between price distortion and public debt, and as such,
we include a quadratic in the estimation.
The term Continent is a categorical variable comprising of Africa, Asia, and South
America. In the estimation, Africa is considered as the reference category. The
inclusion of this term is to examine whether there is a significant difference in the
nominal rate of assistance, tax policy, and relative price margin between Africa and the
other continents. The inclusion of the continental dummy is inspired by Magrini et al.
(2014). In all the estimations, we accounted for product (γj), country (ηi), and time (μt)
fixed effects. The error term in the model is represented byεijt. The definition of the
variables used in Eq. 9 is presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Estimation technique
This study makes use of fully modified ordinary least squares (FMOLS). We considered
a pooled sample (that is, both cocoa and coffee) estimation. Product-specific estima-
tions are not considered because some countries produce both products. FMOLS
developed by Phillips and Hansen (1990) is a semi-parametric model that is robust to
serial correlation problems. It provides consistent and efficient estimates even in the
absence of cointegration relation. Further, it is robust to both stationary and
non-stationary series in a single cointegration (Phillips 1995). In order to estimate the
model using FMOLS, the variables are first modified and then the system estimates
directly to eliminate the existing nuisance parameters. The structure of the FMOLS has
a correction term for serial correlation.
Data description
The data used in this paper are from different sources. The outcome variables, the
nominal rate of assistance, and relative price margins are derived from World Bank
agricultural distortion database and International Cocoa/coffee Organizations
Nsabimana and Amuakwa-Mensah Agricultural and Food Economics            (2018) 6:20 Page 13 of 24
respectively. In the latter database, farm-gate and world prices are extracted for trad-
able cocoa and coffee products. The data spans from 1990 to 2009.2 From the database,
we retrieved 18 cocoa- and coffee-trading countries. These include African countries
(that is, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria,
Tanzania, and Uganda), Asian countries (that is, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam),
and Southern America countries (that is, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Mexico, and Nicaragua). Our argument to select relative price margin and
nominal rate of assistance as our dependent variables is that these two variables are
currently the best tools to measure the agricultural price distortions,3 at least NRA
(Anderson 2013). The explanatory variables are sourced from the World Bank’s World
development indicator, International Financial Statistics of IMF, FOASTAT, and the
Polity IV Project.4 Table 5 in the appendix provides details about the source of data for
each variable used in the analysis. The descriptive statistics for the variables used in this
study is shown in Table 1. We observed more variation in nominal rate of assistance,
relative price margin, inflation, institutional quality, mobile phone usage, and internet
connectivity since the standard deviation is relatively higher than the mean of these
variables. The negative mean value of the nominal rate of assistance indicates that
majority of countries over the years have adopted tax regime relative to the subsidy.
This is supported by the mean value of subsidy, which indicates that 82% of countries
over the years have imposed taxes relative to subsidies. The positive mean value of
relative price margin indicates that on average world prices of cocoa and coffee are
relatively higher than domestic undistorted price. Although mobile phone usage is low
on average for cocoa- and coffee-producing countries, the usage of this device became
very popular in the 2000s and its usage has been increasing.
Results and discussion
This section presents and discusses the main results of the study. It begins with the
analysis of the determinants of the extent of price distortion (that is, the absolute value
of the nominal rate of assistance) and then proceeds to test the development paradox,
resource abundance, and group-size effect hypotheses. In the final section, we analyze
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Nominal rate of assist. (NRA) 433 − 0.1934 0.23198 − 0.8426 0.53348
Absolute value of NRA 433 0.231 0.19445 0 0.8426
Subsidy (dummy variable) 405 0.1827 0.38691 0 1
Relative price margin 402 0.18402 0.36888 − 2.8304 0.85986
GDP per capita (log) 439 6.90456 1.07743 4.73512 9.02109
Inflation 420 32.3378 204.506 − 8.4842 2947.73
Public debt 428 74.6945 54.3996 9.54585 448.59
Institution (Polity2) 439 1.98633 5.71506 − 8 9
Mobile phone per 100 439 13.8604 23.7316 0 111.365
Internet connection per 100 365 4.88968 9.54438 0 55.9
% of rural population 439 56.0028 19.5705 15.956 88.924
Land per capita 439 0.4196 0.3704 0.0964 2.244
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the determinants of relative price margin. It should be noted that our analyses are
exploratory regressions aimed to establish the correlation between our outcome
variables and the explanatory variables, and as such we claim no causality. In all cases,
time and country fixed effects have been accounted for.
Table 2 Determinants of absolute nominal rate of assistance
Variables |NRA|
(1) (2) (3)
GDP per capita − 0.14814*** − 0.13091*** − 0.23558***
(0.01356) (0.01616) (0.01156)
Inflation 0.00009*** 0.00016*** 0.00015***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Public debt 0.00088*** 0.00116*** 0.00098***
(0.00012) (0.00015) (0.00010)
Public debt squared − 0.00001*** − 0.00001*** − 0.00000***
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Polity2 − 0.00142*** 0.00063 − 0.00051
(0.00039) (0.00049) (0.00032)
% of Rural population − 0.01344*** −0.00354*** − 0.00469***
(0.00083) (0.00099) (0.00073)
Land per capita − 0.10229*** − 0.03101 − 0.12443***
(0.01741) (0.02097) (0.01408)
Mobile phone usage − 0.00199*** − 0.00139***
(0.00011) (0.00013)
Internet connectivity − 0.00464*** 0.01203***
(0.00024) (0.00039)
Mobile*Internet − 0.00017***
(0.00000)
Coffee 0.05179*** 0.04412*** 0.04412***
(0.00312) (0.00369) (0.00244)
South America − 0.31434*** 0.17051** 0.51257***
(0.05632) (0.07423) (0.05018)
Asia − 0.03850*** 0.07763*** 0.12566***
(0.01432) (0.01729) (0.01159)
Constant 2.08151*** 1.07620*** 1.77840***
(0.12964) (0.15022) (0.11340)
Total effect of mobile − 0.00223***
(0.00013)
Observations 407 347 347
R-squared 0.36531 0.45428 0.47408
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.286 0.373 0.391
Long run SE 0.0196 0.0212 0.0140
Bandwidth (neweywest) 556.1 276.7 540
Standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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Determinants of the extent of price distortion
In Table 2, we analyze the factors which explain the magnitude of price distortion in the
coffee and cocoa industries. Due to the possible high correlation between mobile usage
and internet connectivity, we dropped either mobile phone usage or internet connectivity
in columns (1) and (2). Findings show a negative relationship between mobile phone
usage, internet connectivity, and price distortion (see columns 1 and 2). In model 3, we
find the effect of mobile phone usage on price distortion is conditional on internet
connectivity. This is shown by the significant effect of the interaction between mobile
phone usage and internet connectivity. The negative effect of the interaction term
indicates the complementary effect of internet connectivity in reducing price distortion via
mobile phone usage.
Since access to perfect information is an underlining condition for the efficient func-
tioning of the market, mobile phone usage has the potential of providing farmers with
the needed information in their operations hence reducing price distortions. Given that
the effect of mobile phone usage on price distortion is conditional on internet connect-
ivity, we compute the total effect of mobile phone usage on the extent of price distor-
tion. The results show that a unit increase in mobile phone usage will reduce price
distortion by 0.22% point on average. Given the heterogeneity across countries in terms
of internet connectivity, we further calculate the total effect of mobile phone usage for
each country and the result is shown in Fig. 3. The total effect of mobile phone usage
on price distortion is highest in Mexico with a rate of about − 0.544% point, followed
by Brazil with a rate of about − 0.317% point. Ethiopia and Madagascar were found to
have the least effect of about − 0.141% point and − 0.147% point respectively.
Further, GDP per capita, inflation, public debt, and proportion of rural population
significantly influence the magnitude of price distortions in the cocoa and coffee
industry. With the exception of inflation and public debt, all the factors reduce the
magnitude of the distortion. In the case of GDP per capita, it means that as per capita
income increases, it reduces the extent to which government intervene in cocoa and
coffee industry either in the form of taxes or subsidy. Thus, an increase in GDP per
capita by 1% reduces price distortion by 0.236% point (see column 3 of Table 1). Higher
inflation rate promotes price distortion in the cocoa and coffee industry. This suggests
that in times of persistent increase in inflation, the government intervention in the
Fig. 3 Total effect of mobile phone usage on the extent of price distortion by countries
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cocoa and coffee industry either in the form of tax and subsidy which ends up creating
distortions in prices. An increase in inflation by 1 unit increases price distortion by
about 0.02% point (see column 3). Public debt exhibits a non-linear relationship with
the extent of price distortion. The coefficient of the quadratic is however nearly zero.
From the linear term, an increase in public debt increases price distortions by about
0.098 % point in our pooled model (see column 3). Although institutional quality does
not significantly influence price distortion in model 3, estimation in model 1 shows a
significant negative effect. A good institution is expected to make information easily
accessible and also reduces bottlenecks in the market hence reducing distortion.
Findings also suggest that an increase in the rural population reduces price distortion
by about 0.47% point. This implies that as the rural population increases, it reduces
government intervention in the cocoa and coffee industry through either taxes or
subsidy. Although this result is surprising, it can, however, be explained. Given that
most cocoa- and coffee-exporting countries impose taxes on the products and have
most of their population in the rural area (with exception of Brazil with few popula-
tions in the rural area and also provides a subsidy to the coffee farmer), an increase in
rural population may imply an increase in cocoa and coffee production. With the in-
crease in production, the government may reduce the tax rate if the same tax revenue
is to be realized or if the majority who are in the rural area negotiate for tax reduction.
The results further show that the extent of price distortion in coffee production is
about 0.044 significantly higher than that of cocoa production. The extent of price
distortion is South America and Asia is significantly higher than that of Africa
(see column 3 of Table 2). South America is observed to have the highest level of
price distortion in cocoa and coffee production.
Test of development paradox, resource abundance, and group-size effect
This section seeks to test the development paradox, resource abundance, and group-size
effect hypotheses. Columns 1–3 of Table 3 shows the estimation of the nominal rate of
assistance with the aim of testing the hypotheses mentioned earlier. Unlike Table 2 in the
previous sub-section where the absolute value of the nominal rate of assistance was
considered to analyze the extent of the distortion, Table 3 examines whether or not our
explanatory variables promote tax imposition or subsidy. Our results confirm the develop-
ment paradox, where developed countries tend to subsidize agricultural products and
developing countries rather tax these products (Anderson et al. 1986; Krueger et al. 1991;
Lindert 1991; Masters and Garcia 2009). From columns 1–3 of Table 3, as income
increases, countries end up subsidizing.
In relation to resource abundance or natural resource effect, our results support the
hypothesis that land-abundant countries tend to tax agricultural sector more or subsidize
the sector less (Isham et al. 2005; Masters and Garcia 2009; McMillan and Masters 2003).
Given that the coefficient of land per capita is positive suggests that as land becomes
abundant in the sector, the government provides subsidies to landowners to encourage
them to increase cocoa and coffee production. Most cocoa- and coffee-producing countries
depend on these cash crops as their foreign exchange earnings and as such provides
subsidies in the form of fertilizer, pesticides, and improved seeds. Our results also suggest
that an increase in the share of the rural population have a positive effect on the nominal
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rate of assistance. This finding is in line with that of Masters and Garcia (2009). The
positive effect implies that as rural population increases, they are able to obtain a more
faviourable policy in the form of a tax cut or subsidy, hence corroborating the group-size
effect hypothesis.
Table 3 Testing stylized facts of total NRA
Variables NRA
(1) (2) (3)
GDP per capita 0.35905*** 0.29485*** 0.46387***
(0.01536) (0.01890) (0.01333)
Inflation 0.00025*** 0.00019*** 0.00021***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Public debt − 0.00208*** − 0.00225*** − 0.00180***
(0.00014) (0.00017) (0.00012)
Public debt squared 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001***
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Polity2 0.00232*** − 0.00227*** − 0.00055
(0.00044) (0.00057) (0.00037)
% of Rural population 0.01342*** 0.00108 0.00635***
(0.00094) (0.00115) (0.00084)
Land per capita 0.10445*** − 0.01826 0.11279***
(0.01971) (0.02453) (0.01624)
Mobile phone usage 0.00326*** 0.00314***
(0.00012) (0.00015)
Internet connectivity 0.00538*** − 0.01526***
(0.00028) (0.00045)
Mobile*Internet 0.00019***
(0.00000)
Coffee − 0.02974*** − 0.02908*** − 0.02908***
(0.00353) (0.00432) (0.00281)
South America − 0.21856*** − 0.60544*** − 0.91917***
(0.06378) (0.08683) (0.05787)
Asia − 0.10058*** − 0.22260*** − 0.25916***
(0.01622) (0.02023) (0.01336)
Constant − 3.20019*** − 1.73459*** − 3.18583***
(0.14681) (0.17570) (0.13077)
Total effect of mob. use 0.0041***
(0.0001)
Observations 407 347 347
R-squared 0.36657 0.45797 0.49190
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.288 0.377 0.412
Long run SE 0.0222 0.0248 0.0162
Bandwidth (neweywest) 556.5 276.6 539.6
Standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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Similarly, the positive coefficient for mobile phone usage in columns 1–3 of Table 3
shows that as mobile phone usage increases, government policies turn out to be favorable
for both cocoa and coffee farmers. The positive significant effect of the interaction between
mobile phone usage and internet connectivity also corroborates the benefit of the mobile
phone to farmers. From the total effect estimation, a unit increase in mobile phone usage
increases the nominal rate of assistance by 0.41% point. The country level effect of mobile
phone usage on the nominal rate of assistance is shown in Fig. 4. Whereas Mexico and
Brazil are top on the list, Ethiopia and Madagascar have the least effect of mobile phone
usage on nominal rate of assistance. From the results, whereas an increase in inflation
serves as a form of subsidy for cocoa and coffee farmers in nominal terms, public
debt serves as a form of tax to them. In addition, the nominal rate of assistant for
coffee is about 0.029 less than that of cocoa. Moreover, the nominal rate of assistance for
cocoa and coffee is significantly higher in Africa compared to South America and Asia
(see column 3 of Table 3).
Determinants of relative price margin
In Table 4, we provide estimates showing an empirical relationship between the degree of
trade policies through relative price margins and its respective determinants. Similar to the
nominal rate of assistance, the results show a positive of income on relative price margin.
From our results, inflation and public debts are found to significantly reduce price depres-
sions. The effect of inflation on relative price margin is in line with macroeconomic theories
where it induces an increase in farm gate prices relative to world markets. The negative
effect of public debt on relative price margin can be explained through the loanable funds
market and the exchange rate. As countries experience increasing public debt, there are
signs of high-interest rate, an increase in inflation and exchange rate in such economies as
government compete with firms in the loanable firms market. The increase in general prices
causes farm gate prices to also increase. Institutional quality is found to increase relative
price margin. A good institution can make government policies very effective and as such
policies to create a wedge between the world and domestic prices would achieve its cause.
Whereas, an increase in land per capita significantly reduces the relative price
margin, increase in the proportion of rural population increases relative price margin.
Fig. 4 Total effect of mobile phone usage on nominal rate of assistance by countries
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The positive sign of the share of rural population means that farmers are unable to
negotiate for higher domestic prices as the share of rural population increases.
Conversely, the negative effect of land per capital on price margin implies that farmers
are able to negotiate for a higher domestic price as their land ownership increases. Even
though mobile phone usage has no significant effect on the relative price margin, the
Table 4 Determinants of relative price margin
Variables (1) (2) (3)
GDP per capita 0.24624*** 0.14381*** 0.21119***
(0.03428) (0.05532) (0.06067)
Inflation − 0.00031*** − 0.00029*** − 0.00028***
(0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Public debt − 0.00039 − 0.00225*** − 0.00223***
(0.00029) (0.00049) (0.00050)
Public debt squared 0.00000 0.00000** 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Polity2 0.02421*** 0.03222*** 0.03282***
(0.00095) (0.00159) (0.00162)
% of Rural population 0.01489*** 0.00629* 0.00646*
(0.00205) (0.00325) (0.00366)
Land per capita − 0.40760*** − 0.33199*** − 0.27722***
(0.04146) (0.06768) (0.06979)
Mobile phone usage 0.00301*** 0.00062
(0.00026) (0.00064)
Internet connectivity 0.00589*** − 0.00421**
(0.00079) (0.00191)
Mobile*Internet 0.00011***
(0.00002)
Coffee 0.05421*** 0.07431*** 0.07383***
(0.00755) (0.01202) (0.01217)
South America 0.54560*** 0.02254 − 0.22439
(0.13650) (0.24765) (0.25574)
Asia 0.09120*** 0.07643 0.03850
(0.03437) (0.05729) (0.05871)
Constant − 2.45543*** −0.98560** − 1.37800**
(0.32398) (0.50011) (0.57471)
Total effect of mobile Usage 0.0012*
(0.0006)
Observations 379 329 329
R-squared 0.31399 0.31701 0.32532
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.221 0.208 0.212
Long run SE 0.0461 0.0674 0.0682
Bandwidth (neweywest) 305.5 123 124.3
Standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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total effect significantly increases the relative price margin since the interaction term
between mobile phone usage and internet connectivity is significant. The positive sign
of the total effect of mobile phone usage can be due to the positive relationship
between relative price margin and nominal rate of assistance. In Fig. 5, we show the
distribution of the total effect of mobile phone usage on relative price margin across
countries. The trend of the effect is higher to that of the nominal rate of assistance in
Fig. 4. Relative price margin for coffee is relatively higher than cocoa.
Conclusions
The main purpose of this study has been to examine the effect of mobile phone usage
on the extent of price distortion in the cocoa and coffee industries. In addition, we
tested the development paradox, resource abundance (or natural resource effect), and
the group-size effect hypotheses. We further estimated the determinants of relative
price margin. Our results corroborate all the hypotheses tested, except the resource
abundance hypothesis. Inflation, public debt, mobile phone usage, and institutional
quality are the key factors that affect price distortions in both cocoa and coffee indus-
tries. The effect of mobile phone usage on the extent of price distortion, the nominal
rate of assistance, and relative price margin is conditional on internet connectivity.
The total effect of mobile phone usage was observed to have a negative effect on the
extent of price distortion measured by the absolute value of the nominal rate of
assistance. In addition, we found that as mobile phone usage and internet connectivity
increase, government policies turn out to be favorable for both cocoa and coffee
farmers. Similarly, the total effect of mobile phone usage increases relative price
margin.
Given the fact that the level of technology in the form of mobile telecommunication
and diffusion of knowledge is typically less developed in developing and emerging
countries relative to their developed countries counterpart (Asongu and Nwachukwu
2016), investment in the telecommunication sector will go a long way to improve the
condition of farmers. The following specific policies are proffered based on our results.
First, telecommunication services in the form of calls, text messages, and internet are
Fig. 5 Total effect of mobile phone usage on relative price margin across countries
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most expensive in developing countries (which includes most of cocoa- and
coffee-producing countries) and as such operators are to be encouraged to engage in
cost-efficient measures to reduce their cost of operation. The government should
reduce barriers to entry into the telecommunication industry in order to encourage
competition that would provide a better deal for users of the service.
Second, policies to increase economic growth are relevant to reduce the extent of
price distortion. Since most government generally intervene in the cocoa and coffee
industries to raise tax revenue (with the exception of Brazil), an increase in economic
growth would grant countries other avenues to raise revenue. In addition, an expan-
sion of the economy via economic growth reduces the countries public debt ratio.
Furthermore, monetary and fiscal policies should aim at ensuring price stability.
Economic agents are able to make informed decisions and projections when prices
are stable.
Endnotes
1According to the African Development Bank (2013), the Sub-Sahara African
countries rural population was 64% in 2012.
2We could not go beyond 19 years in this study, although the NRA database is updated
till 2011, the data on cocoa and coffee nominal rate of assistance is only available until
2009. We consulted Kym Anderson, the responsible person at World Bank in charge of
designing and compiling the dataset, however, the dataset is yet to be updated and he is
not sure when this will happen.
3We could have used the Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC) ratio, but since we are
not deriving social welfare loss, we decide to opt for other distortions measurement tools.
4http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
Table 5 Definitions of the variables that are used in this study
Variable name Definitions Data source
RPM The relative price margin, which is the difference
between farm gate and boarder price of cocoa
and coffee
Calculated by authors using from
www.icco.org and www.ico.org
NRA Nominal rate of assistance, the rate at which
agricultural price is taxed or subsidized
World Bank agricultural distortions
data
Institution Proxied by polity2. The polity score is computed by
subtracting the p_autocracy score from the
p_democracy score
Polity IV Projecta
Mobile phone usage The ratio of mobile technology use per 100 persons data.worldbank.org
Internet connectivity The ratio of internet use per 100 persons data.worldbank.org
GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product per capita data.worldbank.org
Inflation Level of inflation, expressing annual changes
of consumer prices
data.worldbank.org
Public debt This is actual nominal public debts expressed
in US dollar
IMF, 2017
% of Rural popu. Rate of rural population as percent of total
population
data.worldbank.org
Land per capita Arable land expressed in ha divided by rural
population
FAOSTAT
ahttp://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Some additional expression of NRA and RPM
Recall from Eq. 4 that y1 ¼ MWp−T−M,
This implies y1M ¼ 1Wp−T−M (A1)
Substituting eq. A1 into Eq. (6) gives:
y2 ¼ W
p
Wp−T−M −1 ¼ y1W
p
M −1 (A2)
y2 = y1ω − 1 (A2a)
Where ω ¼ WpM
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